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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This non-capital Bonneville County case, is related to two capital cases prosecuted close 
in time to this case, one from Bonneville County and the other from Bingham County. This 
Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence in each of these three cases. 1 Indeed, 
initially, this case and the Bonneville County capital case were charged in a single complaint.2 
Further, as the prosecution made abundantly clear in its closing argument to the jury in the 
Bonneville County capital case, a single actor allegedly committed the kidnaping, robbery, rape 
and murder. Thus, the impact of an exoneration in that case must extend to this one. Further, 
the State's ballistics expert opined that a gun purportedly associated with Appellant was used to 
shoot the fatal shots in each of the three related cases. The Bonneville prosecuting attorney 
argued in closing to the capital case jury that since the gun was used to kill the victim in that case 
was seized from nearby a car Appellant abandoned on a Nevada highway median, it is clear that 
Appellant committed the murder. In the instant case, the prosecution relied in its offer of proof 
on the asserted fact that according to its ballistics expert Wally Baker, "one of the bullets 
retrieved from Nolan Haddon's body [was) fired by the .38 caliber revolver that was found 
adjacent to the green LTD in Nevada" which Appellant was seen leaving on a highway median in 
Nevada. Haddon C.R. at 470 (plea agreement). Because the prosecution relied on Appellant's 
proximity to the gun and the expert testimony that the mortal shot came from that gun for the 
1Rhoades v. State, 120 Idaho 795,820 P.2d 665 (Idaho!991) (Bingham County); Rhoades 
v. State, 121 Idaho 63,882 P.2d 960 (ldahol991) (Bonneville County capital case); Rhoades v. 
State, 119 Idaho 594,809 P.2d 455 (Idahol991) (Bonneville County non-capital case). 
2Though this case was charged as a capital case as well, Mr. Rhoades entered an Alford 
plea in exchange for a sentence less than death. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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inference that Appellant was the perpetrator, a showing that he was not the perpetrator in the 
Bonneville capital case requires granting him post-conviction relief or, minimally, an opportunity 
to proceed beyond the summary dismissal stage in postconviction proceedings in the court below. 
In 2005, Appellant filed with the court below his Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
("Petition") seeking relief on four grounds. C.R. at 3. Each ground related to FBI testing in the 
Bonneville County capital case of swabs used to recover evidence, which turned out to be semen, 
from the victim's mouth and vagina. The prosecution had conducted its own testing on the 
swabs before having them sent to the FBI. In particular, the Idaho crime laboratory performed 
PGM testing. The Idaho crime laboratory's test results showed that Appellant could have been 
the contributor because Appellant's and the swab's PGM shared certain features. See infra at nn. 
3 & 4. However, at the prosecution's request, the FBI laboratory conducted more refined PGM 
testing which "did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen." C.R. at 34 
(Affidavit In Support Of Petition For Post-Conviction Relief at Appendix 2, p., 2 (sworn 
declaration of Dr. Hampikian). Shortly after receiving this information regarding the FBI's 
laboratory report, Appellant filed his Petition. 
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A. The First Ground's Three Critical Points: The Bonneville County 
Capital Case Prosecution (1) Knew Or Should Have Known That 
FBI Pre-trial Testing Performed At The Prosecution's Request 
Excluded Appellant As A Contributor Of The Semen Removed 
From The Victim; (2) Elicited But Did Nothing To Correct Patently 
False Trial Testimony From Its Forensic Expert That Appellant Was 
A Potential Contributor Of The Semen Removed From The Victim, 
And Failed To Correct That Same Expert's Misleading Testimony On 
Cross-Examination; And (3) Exacerbated This Misconduct By Asserting 
In Closing Argument To The Jury That Appellant "Matched" The 
Semen When Its Expert Had (Falsely) Testified That Appellant Was 
Only a Possible Contributor, Together And Separately Constituting 
Egregious Misconduct In Violation Of State And Federal Constitutional 
Guarantees. 
Two documents were attached to Appellant's Affidavit In Support Of Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief("Supporting Affidavit"): (I) the FBI document dated about six months pre-trial 
which memorialized the results of its more refined PGM testing, as compared to the PGM testing 
for the prosecution by the state laboratory, of swabs of semen removed from the victim's mouth 
and vagina3 (see C.R. at 30, Supporting Affidavit at Appendix I), and (2) the June 20, 2005, 
sworn statement, from Greg Hampikian, Ph.D., an expert in forensic biology and a Boise State 
University associate professor with a joint appointment in Biology and Criminal Justice 
Administration,' in which he noted that while the State ofldaho Forensic Laboratory testing 
on swabs of semen removed from the victim "did not exclude Mr. Rhoades as a potential 
3The state laboratory and the FBI both conducted what is referred to 
phosophoglucomutase ("PGM") testing. PGM is a kind of genetic marker which may be found 
in bodily fluids. Bodily fluids containing PGM can be analyzed to determine the contributor's 
particular PGM features. There are less refined and more refined kinds of PGM testing. As 
noted in the text, the FBI testing was more refined, as compared to that conducted by the state 
laboratory. 
4Since attesting to that statement, Boise State University has promoted Dr. Hampikian to 
full professor and granted him tenure. 
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contributor of the semen[,) .. . the more refined test performed by the FBl5, at the request 
of the Idaho lab, did absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen." C.R. at 
34 (Supporting Affidavit at Exhibit 2, p. 2).6 
5Here, Dr. Hampikian is referring to the same FBI test results memorialized in the FBI 
document attached to the affidavit as Exhibit 1 and dated about six months pre-trial. 
6ln the related Bonneville County capital case postconviction proceedings regarding DNA 
testing and now before this Court on review as Case No.34236, Appellant filed an additional 
sworn statement from Dr. Hampikian regarding the FBI testing (the same testing at issue in the 
instant case). There, to remove the possibility that a court might think that the information in Dr. 
Hampikian's June, 2005, affidavit was unavailable to forensic experts at and before the time of 
Appellant's trial, Appellant filed a second affidavit from Dr. Hampikian in December, 2005. In 
that supplemental affidavit, Dr. Hampikian attests that: 
[T]he kind of analysis I conducted to arrive at the conclusions I 
reached in my June 20, 2005, affidavit was not only universally 
accepted by forensic biologists and forensic serologists in 1987, it 
also was a basic tool known to and employed by forensic experts in 
investigating offenses where evidence containing body fluids might 
help uncover a perpetrators identity. The kind of analysis I 
employed using the FBI PGM subtyping test results was, in 1987, 
on a par with similar uses of blood typing test results. Indeed, the 
State crime laboratory letter to the FBI Laboratory's Forensic 
Serology Unit requesting PGM subtyping was a standard and 
typical request when it was made on June 3, 1987. See Appendix 1 
(State ofldaho Department of Health and Welfare Bureau of 
Laboratories' senior Criminalist Ms. Pamela J. Marcum' s letter to 
FBI) .... Ms. Marcum's correspondence shows clearly that the 
State ofldaho crime laboratory reflected the universal acceptance 
by forensic biologists and forensic serologists of PGM subtyping 
and the kind of analysis I conducted to reach the conclusion I 
arrived at in my June 20, 2005, affidavit. The results reported by 
the FBI in its July 13, 1987, letter to Ms. Marcum were clear, 
unambiguous, and used a standard reporting language that would 
be understood by any forensic serologist or forensic biologist of the 
day. See appendix 2 (FBI Laboratory report to Ms. Marcum) ... 
. This result completely excludes Mr. Rhodes [sic] from being the 
donor of the semen sample found on the victim[.] .. furthermore, 
there is no indication in the FBI report that this finding could be an 
artifact, or that there was any evidence of a mixture in the sample. 
The standard and universally accepted conclusion in 1987 (as 
4 
The Affidavit In Support Of Petition For Post-Conviction Relief notes that: 
While [the prosecution] knew or should have known that the FBI 
laboratory report exonerated Petitioner, it not only failed to dismiss 
the charges against Petitioner, it elicited testimony from its forensic 
expert ... that his ... PGM test results revealed that Petitioner was a 
potential contributor of the semen recovered from the victim. See, 
e.g. Tr. at 1687-89. 
C.R. at 23 (Supporting Affidavit at 3). The prosecution forensic expert also testified that the 
PGM test results from swabs of the crotch of the victim's sweatpants revealed that Appellant was 
a potential contributor.7 While the prosecution's forensic expert's direct examination testimony 
was true as far as it went, the prosecution omitted to elicit information critical to fully and fairly 
evaluating the state crime laboratory's test results. Specifically, the prosecution failed to inform 
the jury through this expert witness or any other witness that the more refined FBI laboratory 
tests yielded results which contradicted the Idaho crime laboratory test results. In failing to do 
so, the prosecution engaged in the functional equivalent of suborning perjury. The prosecution 
exacerbated its misconduct by allowing its expert witness, on cross-examination, to further 
mislead the jury that the scientific testing conducted on the recovered semen inculpated 
Appellant even though it knew or should have known that the testing exculpated him: 
Q. . .. Now, as I understand it, there's also other tests 
today) is that the known sample from Paul Rhoades [sic] does 
not match the questioned semen sample (QI) taken from the 
victim's body. Paul Rhoades is excluded as a contributor of 
the semen sample QI. 
R. Vol. I, p.199-202 ( emphasis added). 
7Bonneville County Case No. 87-04-547 Trial Tr., Vol. VI, p.1661, Ls. 11-12; p. 1663, 
Ls. 13-25; & p. 1164, Ls. 1-9. 
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available to subtype or subclass the PGM 
readings? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it's a fact that you personally did not run any 
of those tests, did you? 
A. No. 
Q. Would that not have been helpful to you in further 
including or excluding possible donors in this 
particular case? 
A. Those samples were sent off for that subtyping. 
Q. And they were also inclusive weren't they? 
A. I can't address those results, I did not do the 
analysis. 
Bonneville County Case No. 87-04-547, Tr. at 1779 (emphasis added). Worse, in closing 
argument, the prosecution transformed its forensic expert's sworn description of Appellant as a 
possible contributor [in ]to a "match." 
Who matches that semen? Only the defendant, Paul Ezra Rhoades . 
. . . He, alone of the persons who had access, matches. 
And as between those two men seen in that van this defendant, 
Paul Ezra Rhoades, is the only one who, matches those 
characteristics. 
There's an interesting point that both semen samples, that in the 
vagina and that in the mouth match this defendant, they match each 
other. What does that tell us? That they were deposited by the 
same individual. It's not coincidence that they're the same, but 
they're the same because they were deposited by this defendant. 
6 
Bonneville County Case No. 87-04-547, Tr. at 2120-21 (emphasis added). 
Based on the FBI document, Dr. Hampikian's sworn statement, and transcript excerpts, 
Appellant claimed in his First Ground that the prosecution's (1) failure to advise trial counsel or 
subsequent counsel of the FBI testing's exoneration of Appellant, (2) failure to dismiss the 
charges against Appellant, (3) failure to correct its expert witness' false and misleading 
testimony, and (4) exaggeration of that witness' testimony in guilt phase closing argument 
violated Appellant's rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (I 963), Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), and Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Sections 6 ( cruel and 
unusual punishment prohibited) and 13 (due process guaranteed) of the Idaho Constitution, as 
well as Sivak v. State, 8 P.3d 636, 647 (Idaho 2000) ("Applying this rule as the State requests 
would result in Idaho courts being unable to entertain evidence of actual innocence in successive 
post-conviction petitions, even where the evidence was clearly material or had been suppressed 
by prosecutorial misconduct."). 
B. Second Ground: Appellant's Actual Innocence Of The Crimes Of 
Conviction Follows, Inferentially, From The Prosecution's Evidence, 
The Prosecution's Its Contention That A Single Individual Was 
Responsible For Criminal Acts In The Related Bonneville County 
Capital Case, And The FBI Laboratory's Exclusion Of Appellant 
As A Source Of The Semen Removed From The Victim. 
In his Second Ground for post-conviction relief, Appellant claimed that he was actually 
innocent of the offenses of conviction as well as any of their lesser included offenses. He 
claimed, alternatively, that if he was unable to meet the actual innocence burden required for 
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release, he would at least meet the burden required to have all previously defaulted claims 
considered on their merits. This ground rested on the FBI's test report and Dr. Hampikian's 
sworn statement described above as well as the prosecution's contention that the rapist and killer 
in the Bonneville County capital case was a single person. It was brought pursuant to Herrera v. 
Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993); Jackson v. Calderon, 211 F.3d 1148, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) ("As we 
have noted, ... a majority of the Justices in Herrera would have supported a claim of free-
standing actual innocence"); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995); 19-4901 et seq., the Idaho 
Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1 (right to defend life and liberty guaranteed), 2 ( equal 
protection guaranteed), 3 (United States Constitution as supreme law of the land), 5 (habeas 
corpus guaranteed), 6 ( cruel and unusual punishment prohibited), 13 ( due process guaranteed), 
and the United States Constitution, Article!, Section 9 (right to habeas corpus), and the Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As it relates to Appellant's proposed Second 
Ground, this appeal is brought pursuant to those same authorities. 
C. Third Ground: Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance By 
Failing To Provide Critical Information To Its Forensic Expert 
Regarding The FBI Testing. 
In his Third Ground for postconviction relief, Appellant claimed that trial counsel-the 
same counsel for Appellant as in his Bonneville County capital case-failed to provide the 
defense forensic expert with sufficient and available information regarding the PGM testing. 
Specifically, Appellant noted that while their expert questioned whether the swab contained 
spermatozoa or, instead, the victim's cells, trial counsel failed to provide the expert with 
information available to them that each of the swabs represented excellent semen samples. 
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Appellant asserted upon information and belief that had the defense expert been apprised of this 
information, he would have modified his opinion from one which neutralized the FBI report to 
one which viewed it as plainly exculpatory. Appellant also asserted upon information and belief 
that defense counsel's failure in these regards also precluded defense counsel from (1) 
appreciating the critical need to pursue forensic testing of all available biological evidence and 
(2) preparing adequate cross-examination of the State's forensic expert regarding the FBI's PGM 
testing in the Bonneville County capital case and, then, eliciting testimony regarding its 
exculpatory implications for Petition in this case. Of course, Appellant also alleged that but for 
this deficient performance, the outcome of the state proceedings underlying the instant case 
would have been different. 
D. Fourth Ground: Appellant Should Be Allowed To Conduct DNA 
Testing On Biological Evidence Collected During The Investigation 
Of The Offense Underlying These Proceedings. 
In light of the new understanding of the FBI' s test results, Appellant contends that he 
should be allowed to conduct deoxyribonucleic acid ("DNA") testing on any and all biological 
evidence collected by the State in the investigation of the murder which gave rise to the instant 
case. Without limiting the requested testing to them, Appellant enumerated particular items 
which he sought to be tested, specifically a glass vial containing a scraping collected at the crime 
scene and coming, according to the police who collected it, possibly from the perpetrator; 
fingernail scrapings collected from the victim, Nolan Haddon; a blood stained !-shirt removed 
from Mr. Haddon; and a vial of dry blood, a bloody one dollar bill, and clothes from Mr. 
Haddon. C.R. at 14-15 (Petition/or Post-Conviction Relief at 12-13). The State disclosed no 
9 
direct evidence-scientific, eyewitness, or otherwise-placing Appellant at the scene at the time of 
the offense, let alone showing that he committed the offense. C.R. at 14 (Petition For Post-
Conviction Relief at 12). 
E. The Lower Court's Rationale For Summarily Dismissing The Petition. 
The court below summarily dismissed all four claims, ruling that each was filed outside 
the one year statutory limitations period, I.C. § 19-4902, and that Appellant was not entitled to 
equitable tolling on any of them. The court below denied equitable tolling despite the 
prosecution's violating Appellant's federal and state constitutionally guaranteed right to due 
process in the Bonneville County capital case (1) by failing to fully and honestly discharge its 
constitutional obligations to advise him at any time before the defense discovered through its 
own independent inquiry that the F.B.I. testing conducted at the prosecution's request 
contradicted the results from the state crime laboratory testing8;(2) by eliciting the functional 
equivalent of perjured testimony from its serological expert witness and failing to take any steps 
to advise the jury, court or defense that the testimony was false; and (3) by exaggerating the false 
testimony, thus exacerbating its prejudice, in closing argument. Those violations led to 
Appellant's conviction and death sentence in that case. But for his conviction and death sentence 
in that case, he would not have pleaded guilty in the instant case. 
8The expert was retained out of an abundance of caution, and his conclusions were made 
shortly before Appellant filed his Petition. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Appellant appeals the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition. Generally, 
Appellant claimed that the prosecution would not have obtained the conviction in the instant 
case, through an Alford plea, but for its misconduct in the related Bonneville County capital case, 
in which a jury had convicted Appellant of first degree murder.9 See supra. 
Appellant was put on notice of those claims when his retained expert genetic biologist, 
Dr. Hampikian, provided his opinion that the FBI test results excluded Appellant as a contributor 
of the semen collected from the victim. Appellant received that opinion shortly before filing his 
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief and supporting documents. Appellant had retained Dr. 
Hampikian out of an abundance of caution in this case where the Appellant's life hangs in the 
balance, not because he had at that time evidence of prosecutorial misdeeds. The district court 
dismissed as untimely all of Appellant's claims, ruling that his Petition was not filed within the 
statutorily mandated time and that he was not entitled to any equitable tolling. 
Thus, there are two related issues in this appeal: 
(1) Whether the district court abused its discretion in summarily dismissing the Petition For 
Post-Conviction Relief for untimely filing even though Appellant had no notice of the 
prosecutorial misconduct claims ("First Ground") or the scientific basis for his actual 
innocence claim ("Second Ground"), his ineffective assistance of counsel claim ("Third 
Ground"), or his claim to test the biological evidence for DNA ("Fourth Ground") until 
he consulted an expert out of an abundance of caution, and even though neither trial 
9 An appeal of denial of post-conviction relief in that related Bonneville County capital 
case is now pending before the Court as Case Number 34236. 
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defendants nor postconviction petitioners have any obligation to search for evidence of 
prosecutorial misdeeds, absent notice of their existence; 
(2) Whether the district court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard to 
determine whether Appellant was entitled to equitable tolling and, alternatively, whether 
in any event Appellant met the standard which the district court erroneously employed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT BELOW ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR FAILURE TO 
ESTABLISH ENTITLEMENT TO EQUITABLE TOLLING. 
Idaho Code Section I 9-490l(b) provides that Idaho law is clear that a successive 
postconviction petition is timely if (I) it was not reasonable to expect the petitioner to have 
known of its underlying facts at the time of his first petition and (2) if the successor petition was 
filed within a reasonable amount of time of his discovering the underlying facts. This Court has 
noted several strict rules created and enforced to ensure the integrity of trials as a truth finding 
process. These rules and their purpose are relevant here. 
Defense attorneys are entitled to rely on the presumption that 
prosecutors have fully discharged their official duties, including the 
duty to disclose exculpatory material. [Strickler v. Greene, 527 
U.S. 263, 286-87 (1999)]. 
A State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false 
testimony, to obtain a conviction[,] Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 
(1959)[, and that] [t]his standard applies not only to false evidence 
solicited by the prosecution, but also to false evidence that the 
prosecution allows to go uncorrected. Id A stricter materiality 
standard applies to cases involving the prosecution's knowing use 
of false testimony than to cases where the prosecution has failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence. Agurs, 427 U.S. at I 03-04. This is 
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because these cases "involve a corruption of the truth-seeking 
function of the trial process." Id at 104. In Bagley, the U.S. 
Supreme Court quoted Agurs for "the well-established rule that a 
conviction obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony is 
fundamentally unfair, and must be set aside if there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected 
the judgment of the jury." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678 (quoting Agurs, 
427 U.S. at 103) (emphasis added). "[T]he fact that testimony is 
perjured is considered material unless failure to disclose it would 
be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Id at 680. 
Sivakv. State, 134 Idaho 641,647 & 649, 8 P.3d 636,642 & 644 (2000). Further, "[a] stricter 
materiality standard applies to cases involving the prosecution's knowing use of false testimony 
than to cases where the prosecution has failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. Agurs, 427 U.S. 
[97], 103-04 [(1976)]. This is because these cases 'involve a corruption of the truth-seeking 
function of the trial process.' Id. at 104." Sivak. 
Idaho Code Section 19-4908 provides that there may be "sufficient reason" for not 
asserting or inadequately raising a ground for relief in an original, supplemental, or amended 
petition. That section also provides that postconviction claims are not waived by petitioners 
unless done so knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. 
The court below dismissed the petition because Appellant purportedly "failed to establish 
that he is entitled to equitable tolling" of the statutory limitation period for filing the petition. As 
shown below, though, the lower court's conclusions cannot be squared with the evidence 
contained in the Petition and Supporting Affidavit. 
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A. The court below abused its discretion in finding that Appellant presented no 
evidence "that the prosecution knew of an alternative interpretation of the 
FBl's PGM report at the time of trial and deliberately withheld that 
information from Petitioner." 
Contrary to the lower court's finding, Appellant presented material evidence that the 
prosecution in the Bonneville County capital case knew that the results contained in the FBI's 
PGM report contradicted the state laboratory's test results. In particular, Appendix 1 of the 
Supporting Affidavit is a copy of the FBI's PGM Report addressed to the attention ofa "Senior 
Criminalist" (Ms. Pamela J. Marcum) at the Idaho state crime laboratory and dated July 13, 1987, 
over half a year before the case went to trial. That report notes that the FBI testing was requested 
by the state crime laboratory, specifically by the Senior Criminalist, on June 3, 1987. Further, 
Appendix 2 of the Supporting Affidavit is a sworn statement from Appellant's forensic biology 
expert, Greg Hampikian, Ph.D. Dr. Hampikian attested that: 
During the investigation of the rape and murder of Susan 
Michelbacher, the State ofldaho Forensic Laboratory conducted 
PGM testing. Its testing did not exclude Mr. Rhoades as a 
potential contributor of the semen. However, the more refined test 
performed by the FBI, at the request of the Idaho lab, did 
absolutely exclude Mr. Rhoades as a contributor of the semen. See 
Appendix I (State Laboratory cover letter to FBI lab.). 
C.R. at 34 (Supporting Affidavit at Appendix 2, p. 2, para. 6). Subsequently, Appellant filed a 
second sworn statement from Dr. Hampikian in which he noted that the FBI' s more refined 
testing was the more discriminating (as compared to the state laboratory's testing) and the then-
established state of the art forensic PGM subtyping test. Dr. Hampikian continued: 
It is accepted forensic science that less discriminating test results 
must be interpreted in light of subsequent more discriminating test 
results. Considering less discriminating test results and ignoring 
subsequent, more discriminating and, therefore, definitive results 
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in unacceptable forensic scientific practice. Basing a conclusion 
solely on the State laboratory's PGM test when the FBI's more 
discriminating test results were available would make little sense, 
assuming that the goal was a reliable conclusion. I have read Mr. 
Wyckoff s and all other relevant trial testimony regarding the 
State's PGM testing as well as the State's and FBI laboratory 
reports and correspondence. It is troubling that while Mr. 
Rhoades' jurors learned of the State's PGM test results, they were 
never presented testimony or documents regarding the FBI's more 
discriminating PGM test results. This omission promoted the 
incorrect inference that Mr. RHoades was a possible contributor of 
the detected PGM; in fact, the FBI's results excluded him. 
C.R. at 84 (Attachment to Affidavit In Support Of Opposition To Motion For Summary Dismissal 
Based Upon Statute of Limitations at 2). 
Even if the state crime laboratory and the FBI laboratory were not so obviously agents of 
the Bom1eville County Prosecuting Attorney's Office for purposes of investigating the 
Bollleville County capital case, it is beyond dispute that the FBI crime laboratory and state crime 
laboratory analysts were aware of the report's meaning. Otherwise, the state analysts' sending 
the evidence to the FBI laboratory for more refined testing would have been senseless. C.R. at 34 
(Sworn Declaration of Dr. Hampikian at 2). The prosecuting attorneys should likewise have 
known the report's meaning. As the Supreme Court has held, "the individual prosecutor has a 
duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in 
the case[.]" Kylesv. Whitley,5!4U.S.419,437(1995). 
Further, the district court assertion that Appellant's understanding of the FBI report is an 
"interpretation" has no basis in the record evidence. The only explanation of the FBI report 
before that court was from Appellant's expert, Dr. Hampikian. Dr. Hampikian did not provide 
an opinion or "interpretation." Rather, he noted in no uncertain terms that the FBI testing results 
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absolutely excluded Appellant as the source. Likewise, there can be no question that the 
prosecution was or should have been aware of this meaning and, therefore, corrected its 
serological expert's false testimony. 
Finally, even if there are competing interpretations of the FBI report, the evidence before 
the court below was that at least one credible interpretation wholly exculpated Appellant. The 
prosecution knew or should have known this. Consequently, the prosecution would still have 
been obligated to correct its expert's testimony that his PGM testing showed that Appellant was 
within the universe of possible contributors. This is because the FBI's more refined testing 
showed otherwise. Specifically, on this view of the FBI's report-a view wholly unsupported by 
record evidence-its more refined testing showed that Appellant may have been excluded from 
the universe of possible contributors. In short, even if the FBI's report provided a less than 
certain result, the uncertainty that Appellant was within the universe of possible contributors 
would have contradicted the state crime laboratory's certain result that Appellant was within that 
universe. 
B. The court below abused its discretion in finding that Appellant presented no 
evidence "that the prosecution's serological expert's testimony was perjured, 
let alone at the elicitation of the prosecution." 
For the same reasons and based on the same authorities provided in the previous 
subsection, Appellant contends that the lower court abused its discretion in finding that 
Appellant presented no evidence that the prosecution's serological expert's testimony was 
perjured, let alone at the elicitation of the prosecution. The prosecution knew or should have 
known of the FBI test results and their meaning. With that information, the prosecuting attorneys 
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knew or should have known that their serological expert provided the functional equivalent of 
perjured testimony when he testified about the state crime laboratory's PGM test results while 
omitting any mention of the FBI laboratory's more refined PGM test results. 
II. THE LOWER COURT USED THE WRONG LEGAL STANDARD TO 
ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDE THAT APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT 
HE WAS ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE TOLLING. 
In addition to abusing its discretion in its factfindings, erroneously applied two legal 
standards. First, the lower court held Appellant to a high federal legal standard which Idaho has 
never adopted. In particular, noting that entitlement to equitable tolling in federal habeas 
proceedings turns on the petitioner's showing that some extraordinary circumstance stood in the 
way of his timely filing, the court below went on to rule that Appellant failed to meet that burden. 
C.R. at 90 (Memorandum Decision And Order On Motion For Summary Dismissal at 6). 
However, even if the "extraordinary circumstances"standard did properly apply here, Appellant 
met it. 
Defendants are entitled under the Idaho and federal constitutions to rely on the 
prosecution abiding its legal obligations. Idaho Const. art. I, § I I; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 
The United States Supreme Court has summarized the long established legal framework 
describing the government's responsibilities and defendants' correlative rights in litigation: 
It has long been established that the prosecution's "deliberate 
deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false 
evidence is incompatible with rudimentary demands of justice." 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (quoting Mooney 
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. I 03, 112 (1935) (per curiam)). If it was 
reasonable for Banks to rely on the prosecution's full disclosure 
representation, it was also appropriate for Banks to assume that his 
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prosecutors would not stoop to improper litigation conduct to 
advance prospects for gaining a conviction. See Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); Strickler v. Greene, 527U.S. 263, 
284 (1999) . 
. . . The State ... suggests that Banks's failure, during state 
postconviction proceedings, to "attempt to locate Farr and ascertain 
his true status," or to "interview the investigating officers, such as 
Deputy Huff, to ascertain Farr's status," undermines a finding of 
cause; the Fifth Circuit agreed .... In the State's view, "[t]he 
question [ of cause] revolves around Banks's conduct," particularly 
his lack of appropriate diligence in pursuing the Farr Brady claim 
before resorting to federal court .... We rejected a similar 
argument in Strickler . ... Our decisions lend no support to the 
notion that defendants must scavenge for hints of undisclosed 
Brady material when the prosecution represents that all such 
material has been disclosed. As we observed in Strickler, defense 
counsel has no "procedural obligation to assert constitutional error 
on the basis of mere suspicion that some prosecutorial misstep may 
have occurred." 527 U.S., at 286-287. The "cause" inquiry, we 
have also observed, turns on events or circumstances "external to 
the defense." Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214,222 (1988) (quoting 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,488 (1986)). 
Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 694-695 (2004) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Having 
laid out the framework of fairness by which the government is constitutionally mandated to 
litigate criminal cases, the Court went on to reject the very argument which Respondent makes in 
the instant case -that if a postconviction petitioner discovers the prosecution's concealed 
wrongdoing only after the statutory limitations period has expired, any claim based on that 
wrongdoing must be dismissed as untimely. The Supreme Court squarely rejects this position: 
The State here nevertheless urges, in effect, that "the prosecution 
can lie and conceal and the prisoner still has the burden to ... 
discover the evidence," Tr. of Oral Arg. 35, so long as the 
"potential existence" of a prosecutorial misconduct claim might 
have been detected, id., at 36. A rule thus declaring "prosecutor 
may hide, defendant must seek," is not tenable in a system 
constitutionally bound to accord defendants due process. 
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"Ordinarily, we presume that public officials have properly 
discharged their official duties." Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 
909 (1997) (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 
272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926)). We have several times underscored the 
"special role played by the American prosecutor in the search for 
truth in criminal trials." Strickler, 527 U.S., at 281; accord, Kyles 
[v. Whitley], 514 U.S. 419, [] 439-440 [(1995)]; United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,675, n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 
(1985); Berger, 295 U.S., at 88. See also Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438,484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Courts, 
litigants, and juries properly anticipate that "obligations [to refrain 
from improper methods to secure a conviction] ... plainly rest[ing] 
upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed." 
Berger, 295 U.S., at 88, 55 S.Ct. 629. Prosecutors' dishonest 
conduct or unwarranted concealment should attract no judicial 
approbation. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440 ("The prudence of the 
careful prosecutor should not ... be discouraged."). 
Banks at 696. Similarly, this Court has held that even where procedural obstacles would 
otherwise bar considering it, Idaho courts must entertain evidence of actual innocence where it is 
"clearly material or ha[s] been suppressed by prosecutorial misconduct." Sivak v. State, 134 
Idaho 641,647 & 649, 8 P.3d 636,642 & 644 (2000). "We must be vigilant against imposing a 
rule oflaw that will work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency." Id. 
Appellant maintained in district court and continues to maintain that he legitimately relied 
on the prosecution meeting its constitutional obligations and that, therefore, he was under no 
obligation to hire an expert to independently examine the prosecution's scientific results to check 
whether the prosecution was meeting its pretrial obligations and to determine during trial whether 
any prosecution witnesses gave false testimony. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons, considered together and independent, the Court should either grant 
post-conviction relief or remand the case to the district court with instructions to reinstate and 
conduct further proceedings on the Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
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